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In this paper I introduce competition in the habit formation litera-
ture by extending the idea of habit formation to the characteristics of
the products. I model a two-period game in which two ￿rms can enter
a market and compete with each other, and individuals’ favorite charac-
teristics in the second period are the characteristics of the product they
consumed in the ￿rst period. I ￿nd that if two ￿rms enter the market,
they do it sequentially. That is, one ￿rm enters in the ￿rst period and at-
tracts individuals’ preferences to the characteristics of its product, while
the other ￿rm enters in the second period and competes for the individ-
uals that have grown to prefer the characteristics of the original product.
However, the second ￿rm’s product is similar to the original one, but not
exactly the same. The model also applies to habit formation for differ-
ent markets with characteristics in common. For example, sweetness is
a common characteristic of sodas and ice-cream, and consumption of a
product in one market affects the preferences for products in the other
market. I ￿nd that new ￿rms produce products with similar characteris-
tics not only to a product that has entered the same market, but to prod-
ucts that have entered other markets with characteristics in common. I
apply my model to durable goods and ￿nd a new explanation for fashion:
￿rms can take advantage of habit formation by showing their products in
the media to generate demand for new durable goods.
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11 Introduction
Psychologists have long observed that individuals increase their enjoyment of many
products just by consuming them repeatedly.2 This applies to many types of food,
beverages, music, etc. Economistshaveformalizedthisphenomenoninmodelsofhabit
formation. However, no model to date that I am aware of has analyzed competition in
markets with habit formation. The goal of this paper is to introduce competition in the
habit formation literature.
Psychologists have also observed that individuals not only increase their prefer-
ence for a product, but for its characteristics as well. I extend habit formation for the
characteristics of the products. This offers several advantages. First, my model can an-
alyze how the consumption of a product affects the preferences for the characteristics
of other products, whose design are de￿ned over the same charateristic space, even in
different markets. Second, it allows us to understand how habit formation affects the
￿rms’ design choices over the characteristics of the products.
In section 2 I introduce my model. I extend habit formation into the characteristics
of the products by modifying Hotelling’s linear city. Hotelling (1929) models competi-
tion in a market where consumers have different preferences for the characteristics of a
product distributed uniformly on [0,1]. Every consumer has a favorite level of the char-
acteristic (favorite location in the characteristic space) and their utility decreases as the
characteristic of the product differs from this level. However, the market will provide
only a limited variety of products, and therefore individuals with different preferences
will consume the same products.
Becausehabitformationisafundamentallydynamicphenomenon, itisnecessaryto
extend the classically static Hotelling model to more periods. I work with the simplest
possible extension, a two period model. In the ￿rst period I assume that individuals do
nothaveapreferenceoverthecharacteristicsoftheproductsandtheyreceiveaconstant
utility from consumption. The basic assumption of my model is that in the second
period individuals’ favorite location is the location of the products they consumed in
the ￿rst period.
Once an individual has consumed a product and learned to enjoy its characteristics,
she will prefer a product with the same characteristics, even if it is a product from a
different ￿rm. If different individuals grow to prefer the characteristics of the products
2 For a review of the psychological literature see Bornstein, (1989).they consume, and if they consume the same products, then they will grow to prefer the
same characteristics as other individuals. Thus habit formation results in individuals’
favorite locations being clustered in the location of the products that are available.
As a result, the characteristics of the products will explain preferences as much as
preferences explain the characteristics of the products.
In section 2.1 I analyze the case of two ￿rms that have the option of entering a
market where individuals have habit formation. I show that when both ￿rms enter the
market, they do it sequentially: one ￿rm enters in the ￿rst period and the other ￿rm
enters in the second period. I assume that individuals differ in their willingness to pay
for these characteristics (different transportation costs), and that the utility from con-
sumption, gross of transportation cost, is not large. The ￿rst ￿rm attracts individuals’
preferences toward the characteristics of its product and the second ￿rm steals the low-
transportation cost individuals, who prefer the original product but are not willing to
pay much more for it. The entrant produces a similar product to the original one, but
not exactly the same (to relax competition) and sells it at a lower price. I ￿nd that the
￿rm that enters in the ￿rst period has a ￿rst-mover advantage, as its pro￿ts are higher
than those of the second ￿rm.
In section 2.2 I apply the model to analyze how ￿rms compete to increase the avail-
ability of their products. If individuals learn to enjoy the characteristics of a product by
consuming it in one outlet, they will value the same product more, and products with
similar characteristics in other outlets. For example, an individual that consumes Coca-
Cola in vending machines will be willing to pay a higher price for Coca-Cola than a
product with different characteristics, let’s say Max-Cola, in supermarkets, where both
products are sold. If Coca-Cola monopolizes the market for vending machines it will
be able to charge a higher price than Max-Cola in supermarkets. Max-Cola will re-
spond by producing a product that is similar, but not exactly the same as Coca-Cola, to
attract some of the consumer that grew to prefer Coca-Cola.
In section 2.3 I use my model to give another explanation of fads and fashion. I
model how ￿rms can to use habit formation to create demand for new durable goods.
If individuals grow to prefer the characteristics of a product they consume and if it is
a durable product, then these individuals will not buy a new product, since they can
consume the old product by free, which at the same time becomes their most favorite
product. But if there is a second market that is especially important for the in￿uence of
individuals’ preferences, for example the media, ￿rms may be able to change individu-
als preferences toward products with different characteristics by making them available
2in this market. In this way a ￿rm can ￿depreciate￿ an old product by introducing a new
product with different characteristics in the media.
In section 3 I extend my model to multiple markets. Products in different markets
often share several characteristics. For example, sweetness is a characteristic that is
shared by products in many markets. If individuals learn to enjoy the characteristics
of the products they consume, then the consumption of one product would affect the
preferences for other products that have the same characteristics, even in different mar-
kets. For instance, the level of sweetness in sodas will affect the preference for the
level of sweetness for ice-creams. I analyze the simplest case: two markets that share
one characteristic.
I ￿rst analyze the case of a ￿rm that enters in one of the markets in the ￿rst period
and a second ￿rm that enters in the other market in the second period. Individuals
that consume the product in the ￿rst period are going to prefer its characteristics in
both markets in the second period. The ￿rm that enters in the second period will pro-
duce with the same level of the characteristic that both markets have in common. In
other words, there is path dependency even in different markets and ￿rms will take
in consideration what other ￿rms have produced in other markets that share the same
characteristics.
I also analyze the case where two ￿rms enter in the ￿rst period, one in each market.
If both ￿rms can change location in the second period, then they do not have to pro-
duce with the same characteristics in the ￿rst period, but if they do not produce with
the same characteristics, they would in￿uence each other, that is, they would change
their characteristics toward the characteristics of each other in the second period. If
￿rms cannot change location in the second period, they will produce with the same
characteristics as the ￿rm in the other market.
In the case that two ￿rms can enter each market, I show that when both ￿rms enter,
they do it sequentially. However, the ￿rst ￿rm to enter each market has to enter in the
same location as each other. If they do not enter in the same location they will produce
a product that is not the individuals’ most preferred. In this case entering in the ￿rst
period without the same characteristics of the other ￿rm can be a disadvantage for the
incumbent, that new ￿rms can exploit in the second period.
In section 4 I extend my model to include an error in the production process. Pro-
duction processes are normally done with variability and products have deviations from
3their intended speci￿cations. I assume that in these markets ￿rms can invest in reduc-
ing the variability of the products, however, it is costly to do it. In many markets, as
in the case of wine, variability from one year to the other is considerable. I analyze
the case of two ￿rms that can enter the market. I show that both ￿rms choose to enter
sequentially and produce with the same product speci￿cations, differentiating instead
in the variability of their products.
My model is related to the switching cost literature. The switching cost literature
analyzes competition when individuals face a cost if they consume a different product
or brand than the one they consumed in previous periods. Some examples of switching
costs are the costs of learning how to use a product and the need for compatibility with
existing equipment, but it also can be interpreted as brand loyalty [Klemperer 1995].
In a sense, habit formation creates a switching cost for changing a location in a
characteristic space, rather than for switching the chosen brand. Once a consumer has
consumed a product, she will prefer a product with the same characteristics. With habit
formation the size of the cost of switching to another product depends on the charac-
teristics of that product and therefore the size of the switching cost is now endogenous
to the ￿rms. By choosing their characteristics, new ￿rms are choosing the size of the
switching cost to an original product.
The difference is that the switching cost literature does not analyze individuals’
preferences for the characteristics of the products or the products’ design while my
model focus on these.
2 Model
Hotelling (1929) models a linear city of length one. A number of individuals live
in this city and are uniformly distributed across it. There are two ￿rms that sell a
product that consumers see as identical other than the location of the ￿rm where they
purchase it. Consumers have a transportation cost to travel to each store and each
consumer demands at most one unit of the product. Two ￿rms choose their location
and then compete on prices to attract customers. We can also interpret this model as
describing the location of preferences in a characteristic space (for example, the level
of sweetness) where the location of the consumers represents their favorite level of the
characteristic and the location of the ￿rms is the level of this characteristic in their
products.
4An assumption of Hotelling’s model is that preferences are ￿xed and individuals’
present consumption do not affect their future utility. However, psychologists have
observed that when individuals consume many products, they not only increase their
preference for the products, but also for its characteristics. Several studies have docu-
mented that an increase (decrease) in the level of salt, sweetness, fat, etc. in many of
the products that we consume for a few weeks will increase (decrease) our preferred
level of those characteristics, even when these characteristics are found in other prod-
ucts. For example, in one experiment, Bertino and Beauchmp (1986) gave students
food with more salt than what they normally consumed. After only three weeks of the
higher-salt diet, these students began to develop a preference for saltier foods. After
four weeks the students were allowed to choose the amount of salt that they preferred
and it was observed that they continued using a high concentration of salt.3 It is impor-
tant to note that these students not only increased their preference for the speci￿c salty
products they consumed, but they grew to prefer salty food in general.
I modify Hotelling’s linear city model to incorporate habit formation by including
a second period. I assume that in the ￿rst period individuals do not have a favorite
location. In many products, individuals do not have a innate preference for any speci￿c
characteristics of the products and sometimes they cannot even recognize the differ-
ence between different products the ￿rst time they consume them. But if individuals
have habit formation, they will increase their preference for the characteristics of the
products they previously consumed. I assume that in the second period individuals’
preferences are determined by the product they consumed in the ￿rst period. I assume
that the transportation cost is quadratic in the distance to their most favorite location.
Individuals’ utility function in the ￿rst period is given by:
U1 = ￿ ￿ p1
In the second period, if individuals consumed a product in the ￿rst period, their
utility function is:
U2 = S ￿ ￿(l1 ￿ l2)2 ￿ p2 (1)
zero otherwise, where ￿ is the surplus from consumption in the ￿rst period, S
is the surplus from consumption in the second period (gross of transportation cost),
l2 is the location of the product that individuals consume in the second period, l1 is
the location of the product that individuals consumed in the ￿rst period and ￿ is a
3 Other studies that have shown that variations in dietary sodium alter salt preferences are Bertino et
al. (1982) and Blais et al. (1986).
5parameter that represents the disutility individuals face when consuming away from
their favorite location (transportation cost). I assume that ￿ differs for each individual
and is uniformly distributed in the interval [a;b]. For simplicity, I normalize the number
of consumers to one by making a = b ￿ 1:
This de￿nition implies that in the second period, individuals’ favorite location be-
comes the location of the product they consumed in the ￿rst period and their utility
decreases as the product they consume in the second period differs from this location.
Although the assumption that individuals like the characteristics of one product just by
consuming it one time is extreme, it captures the idea that individuals grow to prefer
the characteristics of the products they consume and allows us to model habit forma-
tion in a simple way. Since my main interest is studying competition between ￿rms,
and not how individuals manage their habit formation, I assume that individuals are
not forward looking, that is, they do not take in consideration their utility in the second
period when they choose which product to consume in the ￿rst period.
Hotelling’s model assumes that individuals’ utility gross of price is large enough
that any individual is willing to consume a product, no matter its characteristics. How-
ever, this is highly unrealistic. I assume instead that no individual, independently of her
transportation cost or favorite location, would receive a positive utility from consum-
ing a product that is in the furthest extreme in the characteristic space from her favorite
location.
I assume that two ￿rms can choose to enter the market and if they enter, they have
the option of entering in the ￿rst or second period. If they enter, ￿rms have to pay a
￿xed cost (f) each period. I assume that both ￿rms have no capacity constraint, their
marginal cost is zero, and they cannot change location from the ￿rst to the second
period. The motivation for this is that it is dif￿cult for ￿rms to design new products.
The timing of the game is the following:
First period:
1. Both ￿rms decide whether to enter or not.
2. After a ￿rm chose to enter, it chooses the characteristics of its product.
3. Firms choose prices.
4. Firms produce and sell.
5. Individuals decide to buy or not and if they do, which product to consume.
6Second period:
1. If they did not enter in the ￿rst period, ￿rms decide whether to enter or not in the
second period.
2. Firms choose the characteristics of their products.
3. Firms choose prices.
4. Firms produce and sell.
5. Individuals decide to buy or not and if they do, which product to consume.
The equilibrium concept of the game is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, and I
restrict my analysis to pure strategies. The model is similar to the model of quality by
Gabszewics and Thiesse (1979) 4, where ￿rms can differentiate in quality without any
cost. In the case that both ￿rms charge the same price for their products in the ￿rst
period, I assume that with 50% percent probability each ￿rm sells to every consumer.
This tie rule simpli￿es the analysis, as it rules out the possibility of a mixed strategy in
the second period.
Proposition 1 There is a threshold b; where if b ￿ b; both ￿rms choose to enter
the market sequentially, one ￿rm (incumbent) enters in the ￿rst period and the other
(entrant) enters in the second period. In the ￿rst period the incumbent can choose any
location and charges a price of ￿ for its product. In the second period the entrant will











If b > b; only one ￿rm enters the market. It will enter in the ￿rst period and price
at ￿: In the second period it prices at S, where the threshold b is given by:
b =




Proof. I divide the proof of proposition 1 into two cases:
4 With the difference that S; individuals’ utility, gross of transportation cost, is the same for every con-
sumer.
71) If b ￿ b; it is pro￿table for both ￿rms to enter the market. I show that one ￿rm
chooses to enter in the ￿rst period and the other ￿rm chooses to enter in the second
period while the original ￿rm remains in the market.
2) If b > b; it is pro￿table for only one ￿rm to enter the market.
Case 1: b ￿ b
If both ￿rms enter the market there are three alternatives: 1) that both ￿rms enter in
the second period, 2) that one ￿rm enters in the ￿rst period and the other ￿rm enters in
the second period and 3) both ￿rms enter in the second period. I show that ￿rms enter
sequentially by showing that pro￿ts are higher for both ￿rms if they enter sequentially
than if both ￿rms enter in the same period. Then, I show that both ￿rms choose to enter
the market by showing that pro￿ts are positive (when b ￿ b) for both ￿rms if they enter
sequentially.
Both ￿rms enter in the second period
If neither of both ￿rms enter in the ￿rst period, individuals’ utility from consuming
any product is zero in the second period and neither ￿rm will be able to sell its product
at a positive price. Their pro￿ts are negative once we take in consideration the ￿xed
cost.
Sequential entry
In this part I analyze the case where ￿rms enter sequentially using backward induc-
tion.
Second Period
If the ￿rms enter sequentially, the ￿rst ￿rm attracts individuals’ preferences toward
its product and the second ￿rm will compete for some of these individuals. The new
￿rm decides how similar its product will be to the product of the original ￿rm. The
new ￿rm can eliminate any advantage the incumbent has by duplicating the same char-
acteristics. However, this would increase competition as individuals are indifferent to
both products. Or the new ￿rm can relax competition by selling products with different
characteristics, but this will increase the transportation cost for consumers and indi-
viduals may not want to consume its product. I ￿nd that the new ￿rm will produce a
product that is similar to the original product to attract some of its consumers, but that
it will not produce the exact same product in order to relax competition. This result
seems to capture an important aspect of reality, that latecomers to a market produce
similar products to original ones, but try to differentiate themselves in some way
First I look for the individual (￿
￿) that is indifferent to the original and the new
product:
8S ￿ pi = S ￿ ￿
￿d2
e ￿ pe
where de is the distance from the location of the original product (i) to the product
of the entrant (e), and pi and pe are the prices of the incumbent and entrant respectively.







Individuals with higher transportation costs than ￿
￿ consume the product of the
incumbent, and individuals with lower transportation costs consume the product from
the entrant.
The pro￿t function for the incumbent is:
￿i = (b ￿ ￿
￿)pi ￿ f
and the pro￿t function for the entrant is:
￿e = (￿
￿ ￿ a)pe ￿ f
I ￿rst solve for the ￿rst order condition with respect to price and obtain that prices





































While the entrant has an incentive to differentiate itself as much as possible to relax
competition and increase prices, there is a limit to this as prices cannot go higher than





the price of the incumbent reaches S: If the entrant differentiates beyond the point,









￿ S(b ￿ 1)
￿
We can see that the pro￿ts for the entrant decreases if it differentiate beyond this
point. Therefore, the entrant will differentiate until the price of the incumbent reaches






We know that b ￿ 1 because a = b ￿ 1 and a cannot be less than zero. Given that
b ￿ 1; we can see from equations (2)-(5) that the price and pro￿ts for the incumbent
are higher than those of the entrant. The incumbent has an advantage by entering in
the ￿rst period in markets with habit formation. The entrant will differentiate from
the incumbent by producing a different product than the one individuals have grown to
prefer and sell it to a lower price than the original product.
First Period
In the ￿rst period the incumbent can choose any location as individuals will grow to
prefer any location. Given that individuals are not forward looking, consumers are only
willing to pay the utility they receive for the product in the ￿rst period and therefore
the ￿rm will price at ￿.
Simultaneous entry in the ￿rst period
In the ￿rst period individuals are indifferent to the characteristics of any product.
If both ￿rms enter in the ￿rst period, individuals will consume the product with the
lowest price and the ￿rm that prices lower will sell to every consumer. This intensi￿es
competition as each ￿rm has an incentive to charge a lower price than the other ￿rm
until neither of them earns anything by decreasing the price further. This happens
until the price of the product (negative price) compensates for any difference in pro￿t
for selling to every consumer. The only equilibrium is that both ￿rms price at p1 =
￿non￿￿all, where ￿all are the pro￿ts in the second period if selling to every consumer
in the ￿rst period and ￿non are the pro￿ts in the second period of not selling to any
consumer in the ￿rst period. That is, that they are going to decrease their price until
they pay individuals to consume their product and the negative price would compensate
for any pro￿t they get by getting every consumer. Therefore, the pro￿ts for both ￿rms
are ￿non. If both ￿rms enter in the ￿rst period they would choose the location that
maximizes ￿non: This is the same problem of the entrant in the sequential case and
10the solution is the same. ￿non = ￿e, that is they are equal to the pro￿ts of the entrant
in the sequential game. Nevertheless, the pro￿ts for entering in the ￿rst period have
to include the ￿xed cost of the ￿rst period: Therefore the pro￿ts of both ￿rms, if they
enter simultaneously in the ￿rst period, are lower by f than the pro￿ts of the entrant
in the second period if they enter sequentially.
Pro￿ts are positive for both ￿rms if they enter the market
As I showed, if both ￿rms enter the market they choose to enter sequentially. Now
I have to check if the pro￿ts for the ￿rm that enters in the second period are positive.





2S : For values lower than b it is pro￿table for both ￿rms to enter
the market.
Case 2: b > b :
It is not pro￿table for a second ￿rm to enter the market when b > b: For higher
values of b the incumbent is going to compete more aggressively for the consumers
and the entrant will have to price at a lower level to attract some of these consumers.
2.1 Comparative Statics
In the second period the entrant chooses how similar to produce with respect to the
product of the incumbent. These are the comparative statics of the differentiation cho-











The difference between the product of the entrant and the original product increases
with S. As S increases, individuals are willing to pay higher prices. Given that the
entrant has an incentive to differentiate until the incumbent charges the highest possible







(b + 1)3 < 0
The difference between the products decreases with b. An increase in b means that
it is costlier for consumers to consume away from their favorite location. The entrant
has to produce a more similar product to the original product to attract some of the
consumers of the incumbent.
112.1.1 Social Welfare
Now I analyze how the entry of a second ￿rm affects social welfare relative to a
monopoly that serves the entire market.
Proposition 2 Social welfare diminishes with the entry of the second ￿rm.
Proof. In the case of a monopoly social welfare is given by the total utility of all the
individuals that consume the product (gross of price) minus the cost of production (the
￿xed cost of producing in both periods).
Wmonopoly = ￿ + S ￿ 2f
where Wmonopoly is the social welfare with a monopoly. The social welfare if a
second ￿rm enters in the second period is given by the utility of those individuals that
consume from the incumbent plus the utility of those who consume from the entrant
minus the ￿xed cost for both ￿rms









d￿ ￿ 2f ￿ f
where Wentry is the social welfare when two ￿rms enter the market.By solving the
integral we get:










Because the right hand side of the last equation is negative, the social welfare is
higher under the monopoly case than with competition:
Wmonopoly > Wentry
Even without taking in consideration the additional ￿xed cost of the entrant there
would be a loss in social welfare with the entry of a second ￿rm. This is due to the fact
that with the entry of another ￿rm some consumers consume a product that does not
have their favorite characteristics. In the case of monopoly there is no transportation
cost as individuals consumer the same product that they have grown to prefer, although
the monopoly is able to take all consumer surplus. Although a new ￿rm charges a
lower price and its consumers are better off, there is a loss in social welfare as the ￿rm
produces a different product and its consumers have a transportation cost.
12My model results in excessive entry with just two ￿rms as social welfare diminishes
with the entry of a second ￿rm. However, my model is not taking into consideration the
positive effects of competition: lower prices would increase consumption and increase
welfare. This is the result of the assumption that each individual consumes at most one
unit. However my model isolates the effect that the variety of products has in social
welfare. Variety reduces social welfare as consumers with habit formation do not like
to consume products with characteristics that are different to those of the products that
they consumed in previous periods.
2.2 Vending Machines Vs. Supermarkets
InthissectionIapplymymodeltoanalyzetheeffectsoftheavailabilityofaproduct. In
the previous section I showed that a ￿rm that enters in the ￿rst period has an advantage
with respect to a ￿rm that enters in the second period. Now I analyze how a ￿rm can
enjoy the same advantage by selling its product in more outlets or more stores.
If individuals learn to enjoy the characteristics of a product by consuming it in one
outlet, they will value the same product and products with similar characteristics more
in other outlets. For example, an individual that consumes and ￿learns￿ to enjoy Coca-
Cola in vending machines will be willing to pay a higher price for Coca-Cola than
a product with different characteristics, let’s say Max-Cola, in supermarkets, where
both products are sold. If one of both ￿rms, let’s say Coca-Cola, monopolizes the
outlet of vending machines, it will be able to charge a higher price than Max-Cola in
supermarkets. Max-Cola will respond by producing a product that is similar, but not
exactly the same as Coca-Cola, to attract some of the consumer that grow to prefer
Coca-Cola.
For expositional purposes I will use as an example the market of cola sodas. I
assume that individuals consume cola sodas in two different places: from vending
machines and from supermarkets. There are two ￿rms that can sell their products in
both outlets: Coca-Cola and Max-Cola.
I simplify the problemby assuming thatindividuals onlyconsume sodas fromvend-
ing machines in the ￿rst period and in the second period individuals only consume
sodas from supermarkets. Therefore the preferences are determined in the vending ma-
chines. Individuals want to pay a higher price in supermarkets for the product that is
sold in vending machines. The solution is equivalent to the one of sequential entry in
the previous section. If both ￿rms enter the market of soda colas, one chooses to sell
13in both outlets, while the other only sell in the supermarkets. The ￿rm whose product
is available in vending machines and supermarkets will attract the high transportation
cost individuals and will be able to charge a higher price. The ￿rm whose product is
available only in supermarkets will decrease competition by producing a product with
different characteristics and will attract the low transportation individuals by charging
a lower price.
Proposition 3 If b ￿ b; one ￿rm (Coca-Cola) chooses to enter in the vending ma-
chines and supermarket markets and the other ￿rm (Max-Cola) enters only in the su-
permarket markets. Coca-Cola will produce sodas with any characteristics and Max-












where dMC2 is the distance of Max-Cola to Coca-Cola, pCC1 and pCC2 are the prices
of Coca-Cola in the vending machines and supermarkets respectively and pMC2 is the
price of Max-Cola in the supermarkets.
In the case that b > b only one ￿rm enters the market for soda colas and it sells in
both outlets: In the vending machines it prices at ￿ and in supermarkets it prices at S.
Proof. The proof is the same as Proposition 1.
As before, there are two cases depending of the value of b: When b ￿ b it is prof-
itable for both ￿rms to enter the market. Coca-Cola will sell in both outlets while
Max-Cola will sell in only supermarkets. When b > b it is pro￿table for only one ￿rm
to enter the market.
2.3 Durable Goods, Fads and Change in Preferences
In this section I apply my model to durable goods and ￿nd another explanation for fash-
ion and fads: ￿rms can use habit formation to generate demand for new durable goods
by in￿uencing individuals’ preferences. I assume that, in order to in￿uence prefer-
ences, ￿rms can place their products in other markets where individuals also consume.
We can think of the music industry, where record companies have been known for pay-
ing music stations to play new releases and in￿uence consumers preferences toward
their products, and then pro￿t by selling them in record stores.
14Pesendorfer (1995) models fashion as a signaling device for a dating game and
Karni and Schmeidler (1990) as result of the products’ social attributes like social
distinction. Both models have explained fashion assuming constant preferences. My
model gives another explanation: preferences indeed change as ￿rms use the media to
generate demand for new durable products.
I assume that individuals already have bought and consumed a product and learned
to enjoy its characteristics in previous periods. Additionally, I assume that the products
are durable, so if an individual once buy a product, she can consumed the same product
every period. In this situation no ￿rm can introduce a new product, since individuals
prefer the old product and can consume it for free. However, if there is a second market
where individuals consume and in￿uence consumer preferences, like radio stations, a
second ￿rm could alter the preferences by letting individuals consume a product with
different characteristics in this market. In this way a new ￿rm can ￿depreciate￿ the ￿rst
product by introducing the new product in both markets. For simplicity I assume that
every individual consumes the product of the second market (radio stations).
I assume that the cost of placing its product in the second market is an increasing
function of the transportation cost to the old product, speci￿cally, I assume that this
cost is (dnew)4, where dnew is the distance from the new product to the old product.
We can think of this cost as the bribe that the record companies have to pay to radio
stations5 to play their new releases and this bribe increases as the new product differs
from the music that individuals want to hear. Additionally, I assume that once indi-
viduals consume the new product their preferences will change completely towards its
characteristics, and the price in the second market is zero, as it is the case of radio
stations.










where pnew is the price of the new product.
Proof. In the appendix.
5 This practice is known as payola.
15Individuals with high transportation cost prefer to buy the new product and individ-
uals with low transportation consume the old product at zero cost.
3 Multiple Markets
Until now I have analyzed habit formation in the characteristic space in only one mar-
ket. However, products in different markets often share several characteristics. For
example, sweetness is a characteristic that is shared by many markets, like sodas,
ice-cream, etc. If individuals learn to enjoy the characteristics of the products they
consume, then the consumption of one product would affect the preferences for other
products that have the same characteristics, even in different markets. In this section I
analyze the case of two markets that share one characteristic. For expositional purposes
I solve the case of two markets, but the analysis can easily be extended to many more
markets.
In the case that multiple markets share one or more characteristics, the value of a
product depends not only on where its characteristics are in relation to other products
in the same market, but also in relation to products in other markets that share the same
characteristics. Individuals want to consume products that minimize their transporta-
tion cost to the products they have consumed, even if these products are in different
markets. I extend the de￿nition of individuals’ utility function to two markets that
share one characteristic.
In the ￿rst period, individuals’ utility function for a product in market i is given by:
U1i = ￿ ￿ p1i
and in the second period, the utility function for a product in market i is the follow-
ing:
U2i = S ￿ ￿(l￿
2i ￿ l2i)2 ￿ p2i (6)
and the most preferred location in market i in the second period is given by:
l￿








if individuals did not consume any product in the ￿rst period in market j: If individ-
uals did not consume any product in both markets in the ￿rst period individuals’ utility
in the second period is zero, where ￿ > 0, i and j = 1;2 and i 6= j: (1 ￿ ￿) repre-
sents the in￿uence that products in one market have in shaping the preferences in the
other market. In the case that there is no consumption in one market in the ￿rst period,
individuals preferences in that market will be shaped completely by the consumption
in the other market.
The difference between this de￿nition and the de￿nition of utility function for a
single market is that in the second period individuals’ favorite locations in market i are
a function of previous consumption of products not only in market i, but also in market
j.
3.1 One Firm enters Each Market
I analyze the case where only one ￿rm enters in each market.
Proposition 5 Ifonlyone￿rmentersinoneofthemarketsinthe￿rstperiod, asecond
￿rm that enters in the second period in the other market will produce in the same
location as the product in the ￿rst period in the characteristic they share. The ￿rst ￿rm
prices at v in the ￿rst period and both ￿rms price at S in the second period.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition (5) shows that there is path dependency in different markets in the char-
acteristics they share. If only one ￿rm enters in the ￿rst period, it will determine the
preferences in both markets for that characteristic. After that, if another ￿rm enters it
will produce with the same characteristic to attract the consumers that have to learn the
level of that characteristic.
For example, in a country where individuals eat spicy products, those individuals
will grow to prefer spicy food in general. If a ￿rm wants to introduce a new product,
it would make sense to produce a product with the same level of spice of the other
products people consume. We observe that in Mexico some brands of potato chips
have chile, in United States have barbecue sauce, in Japan seaweed and in India curry.
Those products have adapted to the local taste where individuals’ preferences have
been shaped by other markets.
17Now I analyze the case where two ￿rms enter in the ￿rst period, one in each mar-
ket. If ￿rms can change the characteristics of their products, each ￿rm does not have
to produce with the same characteristics in the ￿rst period, but as the following propo-
sition shows, if they do not do it, they would change their characteristics toward the
characteristics of each other in the second period.
Proposition 6 If one ￿rm enters each market in the ￿rst period and both ￿rms can
change their location, if they produce with different characteristics as the product in
other market, in the second period they will produce with characteristics ￿ l1i + (1 ￿
￿)l1j, that is, they will move toward the characteristics of the product consumed in the
other market in the ￿rst period. Both ￿rms charge ￿ in the ￿rst period and S in the
second period.
Proof. See appendix.
The reason for this is that in the second period individuals’ favorite characteristics
are an average of the characteristics of the products they consume in the ￿rst period. In
the second period ￿rms have an incentive to change their product to match individuals
preferences.
If ￿rms cannot change location in the second period they will produce in the same
location in the characteristics they share.
Proposition 7 If one ￿rm enters in each market in the ￿rst period and if both ￿rms
cannot change their location from the ￿rst period to the second, ￿rms in both markets
will produce with the same speci￿cations in the characteristic they share.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition (7) shows that in the case where only one ￿rm enters in the ￿rst period
in each market and ￿rms cannot change the product speci￿cations, the products will be
aligned in the characteristic they share. If a ￿rm produces a product that is not aligned
with the location of other products that share the same characteristics, individuals’
preferences will not correspond with the speci￿cations of the product and the ￿rm
would earn higher pro￿ts by moving its product to the same location of the product in
the other market.
3.2 Two Firms Can Enter Each Market
Now I analyze the case where two ￿rms can enter in each market. Individuals’ favorite
locations in the second period are the average of the characteristics of the products they
consumed in both markets in the ￿rst period.
18Proposition 8 If b ￿ b; both ￿rms choose to enter the market i sequentially, one
￿rm (incumbent) enters in the ￿rst period and the other (entrant) enters in the second
period. In the ￿rst period the incumbent chooses any location, as long as it is the same
location of the incumbent in market j and charges a price of ￿ for its product. In the











If b > b; only one ￿rm enters each market. They will enter in the ￿rst period and
price at ￿: In the second period it prices at S. They would choose to enter in the same
location as each other.
Proof. See appendix.
The difference with the results for only one market is that each incumbent does
not have ￿rst mover advantage unless it produces with the same characteristics of the
incumbent in the other market. If the incumbents produce with different characteristics,
moving in the ￿rst period can become a disadvantage as they produce products that
individuals do not like in the second period and the entrants can produce the products
that individuals prefer.
4 Production with an error in characteristics
InthissectionIanalyzethecasewhere￿rmsproducewithanerrorinthecharacteristics
of their products. Production process is normally done with variability and products
have deviations from their intended speci￿cations, [Merton (2003), page 3.] In the case
of many markets, the characteristics of the products vary signi￿cantly through time. If
the characteristics of a product change, even if it is from the same ￿rm, an individual
with habit formation will suffer a loss in utility. Individuals prefer products with lower
variability and are willing to pay more for them. I assume that ￿rms cannot choose the
exact characteristics of its product, but only the mean of the production process and the
error is the same for all the products of one ￿rm. I am thinking of a market like wine
where the characteristics changes from year to year, but are stable for the bottles of the
same year.
I de￿ne the speci￿cation of a product as the mean of the distribution of the produc-
tion process.
19y = E [l]
where y is the product speci￿cations and l is a random variable that represents
the production process. The variability allows ￿rms another dimension to differentiate
themselves. I show that in markets with considerable variability in the production
process ￿rms produce with the same speci￿cations and differentiate in the variability
of their production process. The model is an application of the model analyzed in
Cremmer and Thiesse (1994) where it is costly to increase the quality of the products.
In some markets some speci￿cations are associated with a lower variability. For
example, in the case of wine, the reduction in the variability of the grapes is related to
their content of sugar. In order to reduce the variability with which the grapes ripen
they have to be produced in low yield crops which in turn increases the level of sugar
in the grapes. If a ￿rm wants to reduce the variability in the grapes, it has to produce a
winewithahighcontentofsugar[MarkGreenspan(2005).] Insection4.2Iincludethis
phenomenom in my model by assuming that the cost of reducing the variability is lower
in some speci￿cations than others. I show that if the cost of decreasing the variability
is a function of the speci￿cations of the products ￿rms will choose to produce with the
speci￿cations that minimize this cost. If individuals have habit formation, ￿rms want
them to learn the characteristics that decrease their cost of reducing the variability.
I assume individuals observe the characteristics of the products after they consume
them. The expected value of individuals utility in the second period is given by the
following equation:








2 is the variance of the production process in the second period and m2 as
the difference from the characteristics of the product individuals consume in the ￿rst
period to the product speci￿cations of the second period.
I assume that ￿rms can choose the product speci￿cations and variance of the pro-
duction process in both periods. However, it is costly to reduce their variability. I
assume that the error of the production process is i.i.d. between both periods and the
marginal cost is constant in the number of units produced, but it increases as ￿rms
make an effort to reduce the variability of the production process. Following Mussa
and Rosen (1978) I assume that the cost per unit is given by: C = t(k ￿ ￿2)2; where t
and k are two parameters of the cost of reducing the variability, k representing the cost
20of reducing the variability to zero. My analysis does not need any speci￿c distribution.
I assume that the size of the line is one, but the realization of the error can be outside
the line. We can think of a regulation that does not allow products in a market to have
speci￿cations outside certain range, but the realization of the products can be outside
this range. I assume that the ￿xed cost is not large, and both ￿rms wants to enter the
market, that is f < 3
16t:
I assume that ￿rms can produce a product with so much variability that individuals
expected utility would be negative. That is,
k ￿ S
I have to solve the model using backward induction.
Second Period In the second period, individuals want to consume a product
with characteristics that are similar to the ones of the product they consumed in the
￿rst period. The closer the speci￿cations of the product in the second period to the
characteristicsoftheproductinthe￿rstperiodandtheloweritsvariabilitythelowerthe
individuals’ expected transportation cost. Therefore, in the second period, individuals
want to consume products that have the same speci￿cations as the characteristics of
product they consumed in the ￿rst period and that are produced with low variability.
I assume that in the second period both ￿rms decide the speci￿cations and variabil-
ity of their products at the same time.
To solve the model, I ￿rst look for the individual that is indifferent between the
low variability product and the high variability product. I write the transportation cost
of this individual as ￿
￿. Individuals that have a higher transportation than ￿
￿ will
consume product h; while individuals that have a lower transportation cost than ￿
￿
will consume product l; where h stands for high transportation cost individuals, while
l stands for low transportation cost individuals.























21Demand for product h is given by b￿￿
￿ and for product l is ￿
￿￿a, where b￿a = 1;



















Proposition 9 Both ￿rms choose to enter the market sequentially, one ￿rm (incum-
bent), enters in the ￿rst period and the other (entrant) enters in the second period. In
the ￿rst period the incumbent chooses to produce with any speci￿cations; variability
k and prices at ￿. In the second period the entrant chooses the same speci￿cations of
the incumbent. In the second period one of the ￿rms chooses to produce with a high
variance and the other with low variance. The variances chosen by both ￿rms are the
following:
￿2


























First period In the ￿rst period the incumbent can choose any location as
individuals will like any location. The ￿rm will price ￿ for its product as consumers
are only willing to pay for the product the utility they receive in the ￿rst period.
Proposition (9) shows that there is path dependency in the introduction of products.
Once the ￿rst ￿rm enters, it attracts individuals preferences toward the characteristics
of its product. Subsequent ￿rms would choose as speci￿cations the characteristics
of the original product. The preferences and the speci￿cations of the product in the
second period are based on the characteristics of the product in the ￿rst period, not the
intended speci￿cations, but the actual realization of the production, including the error.
22Therefore, an unexpected error in the production will affect the preferences and design
of products in the following periods.
Which ￿rm produces with high variance and which ￿rm produces with low variance
inthesecondperiodisnotdeterminedbytheorderinwhicheach￿rmentersthemarket.
4.1 Variability as a Function of the Location
In this section I analyze the case where the cost of reducing the variability of the pro-
duction process depends of the selection of the speci￿cations. In some markets some
speci￿cations are associated with a lower variability than others. Greenspan (2005)
explains how the reduction in wine yielding can improve the quality of the wine by
reducing the variability of the grapes. However, the reduction in the variability of the
grapes is related to their content of sugar. In order to reduce the variability with which
the grapes ripe they have to be produced in low-yield crops which in turn increases the
level of sugar in the grapes.
I will incorporate this evidence by assuming that the cost of decreasing the vari-
ability is a function of the speci￿cations by making the parameter t a function of y: I
will assume that there is one product speci￿cations y￿ where the cost of reducing the
variability is minimized.
Proposition 10 If there are speci￿cations y￿ where the cost t(y) is minimized, then
both ￿rms choose to enter the market sequentially, one ￿rm (incumbent) enters in the
￿rst period and the other (entrant) enters in the second period. In the ￿rst period
the incumbent chooses to produce with speci￿cations y￿; variability k and charge a
price of ￿. In the second period the incumbent and entrant will produce with the same
speci￿cations as the characteristics of the product of the ￿rst period: The variances
chosen by both ￿rms in the second period are the following:
￿2



















49 ￿ 40b + 16b2￿
Proof. See appendix.
23The incumbent chooses the speci￿cations where it can reduce the variability at
a lower price. This is consistent with the literature in quality in management that
stresses the development of products’ designs that minimizes their variability in their
production.
5 Conclusions
I have introduced competition in the habit formation literature by extending the idea of
habit formation to the characteristics of the products. I analyzed two ￿rms that compete
when individuals grow to prefer the characteristics of the products they consume. This
approach offers several advantages:
First, it allows us to analyze how ￿rms choose the design of their products to re-
spond to habit formation. Second, we can model how the availability of a product
affects individuals’ preference for it. Third, we can model how ￿rms can use habit
formation to create demand for new durable products by showing its product in the
media and therefore, we can give another explanation for fads and fashion using habit
formation. Fourth, it allows us to analyze how products affect the preferences in other
markets that share the same characteristics. Finally, we can analyze competition when
there is an error in the production process.
There are numerous ways this research can be expanded. The ￿rst natural extension
is to study markets where consumers are forward looking. In some products like wine
and cigars, individuals try to ￿re￿ne￿ their preference by learning the characteristics of
certain products like ￿￿ne￿ wines or ￿￿ne￿ cigars. An extension of my model may be
able to explain what are the characteristics that de￿ne a ￿￿ne￿ product. For example,
if individuals want to learn the characteristics of a wine from certain regions, then the
￿ne wines would be considered those that better represent the characteristics of such
regions.
Extending the model to analyze social interaction is essential to understand the
impact of the media. For example, if our concept for beauty is in￿uenced through
habit, as some psychological evidence suggest, there would be a huge social impact
of the media in the markets where beauty is important, like the marriage and the labor
market.
My model assumes that individuals start without any initial preference for the char-
acteristics of the products. However, if individuals with habit formation have initial
24preferences that are uniformly distributed in the characteristic space, it is possible that
two or more ￿rms enter in the ￿rst period and split the consumers between them. The
results of my model would apply to new ￿rms that enter after them and compete for
the consumers that have grown to prefer the characteristics of each product.
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27Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4
Individuals’ utility from consuming the old product is:
S ￿ ￿(dnew)2
Individuals’ utility from consuming the new product is:
S ￿ pnew
I solve for the transportation cost of the individual (￿






Individuals with higher transportation cost than ￿
￿ consume the new product. The
pro￿ts for the ￿rm is given by the demand (b ￿ ￿
￿) times the price of the new product
minus the cost of showing the new product in the media:
￿new = (b ￿ ￿
￿)pnew ￿ (dnew)4
￿new = (b ￿
pnew
(dnew)2)pnew ￿ (dnew)4










I solve for the ￿rst order conditions with respect to the distance and I get the optimal








Proof of Proposition 5
28If individuals only consume in market j in the ￿rst period, then by the de￿nition
of utility function in multiple markets, individuals’ favorite location in market i in the
second period is given by the product they consume in market j in the ￿rst period.
l￿
2i = l1j
That is, individuals utility from consuming from a new ￿rm in market i in the second
period is:
U2i = S ￿ ￿(l2i ￿ l1j)2 ￿ p2i
The location that maximizes the pro￿ts for the new ￿rm in market i is individuals’
favorite location, that is the same location of the product individuals consume in the
￿rst period in market j:
l2i = l￿
2i
Firms charge the highest possible price, that is ￿ in the ￿rst period and S in the
second period.
Proof of Proposition 6
Both ￿rms can produce in any location in period one and still charge price ￿ as indi-
viduals do not care about any characteristics: In the second period individuals favorite
location is an average of the location of the products in both markets:
l￿
2i = ￿l1i + (1 ￿ ￿)l1j
If ￿rms can change location from the ￿rst to the second period, both ￿rms would
move to this location as it is the only location where individuals are willing to pay S.
Therefore, the characteristics of both products in the second period will be an average
of the characteristics of the products in the ￿rst period.
Proof of Proposition 7
If ￿rms cannot change location from the ￿rst to the second period and if both ￿rms
do not produce in the same location that each other in the ￿rst period, in the second
period individuals’ favorite characteristics will not be the same of the products and
individuals would not be willing to pay as much for the products. It is easy to see that
both ￿rms can increase the price they charge for their product to S by changing their
location to the same location of the ￿rm that produces in the other market.
29Proof of Proposition 8
The proof is the same as proposition 1, with the difference that if ￿rms do not enter
in the same location, they can increase their pro￿ts by producing with in the same
location as the ￿rm in the other market. There are two cases:
a) If the ￿rm enters close from the location of the other incumbent, the new ￿rm
will attract some of the low transportation cost consumers by producing further product





















where di and de are the distances from the incumbent and entrant to the individuals
favorite location, that is, to l￿
2i = ￿l1i + (1 ￿ ￿)l1j: We can see from above that the
incumbent wants to produce a product in the ￿rst period that makes d2
i = 0 and the
only location is where l1i = l1j:
b) If the ￿rm enters far from the location of the other incumbent. In this case the
new ￿rm chooses to produce in the individuals’ favorite location, that is location:
l￿
2i = ￿l1i + (1 ￿ ￿)l1j
The highest pro￿ts of the incumbent is given by equation () that is lower than the
pro￿ts it gets by location in the same location as the ￿rst ￿rm in the market that shares
the same characteristic.
Proof of Proposition 9
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By solving for the values of ml; mh; ￿2
l and ￿2













Proof of Proposition 10
Firms’ pro￿ts in the second period are:
￿l = ￿h =
3
16t(l)
Given that the pro￿ts for the ￿rm that enters in the ￿rst period decrease with t(l);
the ￿rst ￿rm enters in the location l￿ where t(l) is minimized.
32